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Introduction
Background
Phenomenological analysis (Giorgi 1985) applies methods of phenomenological philoso-
phy to psychological issues in order to find the meaning of direct experience, so that it is 
the experience itself that tells the true story.
Originally, phenomenology meant the attempt to obtain the things themselves, with-
out being misled by prejudices (Valori 1967). In the field of Psychology, the most elo-
quent definition of phenomenology probably comes from Metzger (1941): “… to take 
the phenomenon simply as it is given, even if it appears unusual, unexpected, illogical, 
absurd, or contrary to unquestioned assumptions and familiar trains of thought. Let the 
things speak for themselves, without side glances at the well-known, at what has been 
learned earlier, at claims of logic, linguistic biases, and deficits of the vocabulary. Face 
the phenomenon with respect and sympathy, but question and distrust the presup-
positions and conceptions with which the phenomenon in question has hitherto been 
grasped”. The natural science of perception, that is, Experimental Phenomenology, is car-
ried out on this premise, and in accordance with that which Bozzi (2002) states, and by 
adopting the methods of scientific research that are so important to the natural sciences, 
by multiplying the observations and perfecting them in precise experimental designs, 
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and by applying them to observable situations in controlled conditions and tracking 
down the logic itineraries that act as a go-between between the laboratory and com-
mon observed reality. After all, research such as that by Rubin, Wertheimer, Michotte, 
Johansson, Kanizsa and many other illustrious phenomenologists diverge as to meth-
ods, procedures and reasoning of the work of the ethologist just for the type of material 
observed alone: colour, transparency, geometry, etc., on the one hand and on the other 
hand that of the animal world. The perceptive event, which is the object of Experimental 
Phenomenology, exists only in as much as it is under observation and that observation 
takes place in the moment of the presence of the object (Stern 1897).
Experimental Phenomenology first obtains a description of a specific type of experi-
ence, starting from the responses given by a sample of subjects, and then educes differ-
ences and similarities in that experience, by extracting structural invariants (Spiegelberg 
1972; Valle and Halling 1989). Kanizsa (1984) calls attention to the fact that Experimental 
Phenomenology does not limit itself to an inventory of phenomena, as is often believed. 
Its aim is much more ambitious: it is to find and analyse causal connections among 
observed phenomena, to individuate conditions that determine, foster and impede their 
appearance and their grade of evidence. All of this occurs without leaving the domain of 
phenomena, without resorting to neurophysiological and physical processes.
It is necessary to emphasize that a certain philosophical/scientific conviction, namely 
those who sustain that since immediate experience of perceived reality is continu-
ally evolving, therefore ungraspable, and not open to rigorous study, it has no reason 
for existing. Within this context, Palmer (2003), in a discussion of methodological 
approaches for the study of perceptive problems, says that phenomenological demon-
stration is a useful, but relatively blunt instrument for studying perceptual organization. 
There are two problems then for phenomenological demonstrations: they are subjec-
tively based and they do not produce quantifiable results.
Aim
The aim of this study is to show that Experimental Phenomenology can lead to conclu-
sions objective and quantifiable. Regarding the first aforementioned point of Palmer, one 
can say that this scepticism derives from a sometimes incorrect distinction between the 
phenomenal terms, subjective as phenomenal is confused with subjective as idiosyn-
cratic (Kubovy and Gepshtein 2003). The former means a characteristic of or belonging 
to reality as perceived before the intervention of consciousness; while the latter means 
something peculiar of a particular individual, arising from conditions within the brain 
or sense organs and not directly caused by external stimuli. In certain cases, subjective 
is prevalently phenomenal (the experience of the colour red is phenomenal, not idiosyn-
cratic), while in other cases it is both things (the experience of beauty is phenomenal 
and idiosyncratic at the same time). Carrying out Experimental Phenomenology means 
studying the phenomenal, and not the idiosyncratic: in the opposite case it is simply the 
subjective experience that is studied.
With the first problem Palmer called attention to out of the way, the second problem 
that still needs discussing regards the quantification of results that can only be realized 
using a mathematical model able to describe the experimental data gathered (Kubovy 
2002). The formal properties of a mathematical model in use must discriminate between 
Page 3 of 15Burro  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1720 
quantification for evaluation (not rigorous method) and quantification for measurement 
(rigorous method). The deduction to be made is that a phenomenological description, in 
order to be considered scientifically authoritative, should rely on a measurement model 
of the results that leads to an scientific result.
The goal of the next sections is to propose a procedure that leads to rigorous measure-
ments in places of research typical to phenomenological investigations, and to offer up a 
new point of view for psychological research and study.
The relationship between numbers and measurements
It can be safely affirmed that all measurements are numbers, but not all numbers are 
measurements. Measuring procedures permit the use of numbers with the aim of 
reflecting on characteristics present at an empirical level. For a fuller discussion, see 
Krantz et al. (1971). Scientific evaluation needs genuine measurements and not just sim-
ple numerical labels, counts, raw scores and ranks. When numbers are used to describe 
results of an experiment, arithmetic is carried out: addition and division are used to cal-
culate an average; subtraction is used for comparing and evaluating any improvements 
in performance; relationships are calculated to estimate possible benefits due to a treat-
ment, etc. However, correct mathematical operations made  on numbers used improp-
erly, apart from making very little sense, can also bring about misleading conclusions.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to have numbers that are measurements in the Psycho-
Social Sciences, therefore also in Experimental Phenomenology. When an experimenter 
uses dichotomous scales of responses, categories such as: very much agree–agree–
uncertain–disagree–strongly disagree; or category ratings in general (Torgerson 1958), 
it is presupposed that: the scale is suitable for obtaining the construct under question, 
the experimental subject is able to make evaluations that are constant over time, scale 
categories are accurately recorded, the distance between categories is constant, having a 
scores is like having a measurement. These are all suppositions.
However, starting from concrete dichotomous or ordinal observations whose raw 
scores have been obtained from categorical evaluations, good approximations of abstract 
measurements are possible. In other words, is possible to attribute at a number the sta-
tus of measurement: with this perspective, characteristic procedures and concepts of 
Fundamental measurements are included (Campbell 1920; Luce et al. 1990). To simplify 
somewhat the complexity of the discussion, it can say that an objective measurement 
can be made if the gathered empirical data are described by a mathematical model that 
has three fundamental properties: linearity, stochastic independence, and specific objec-
tivity. It is possible to sum up these three properties in one term with the so-called prop-
erty of concatenation: if you add (or concatenate) to object mass 1 (or concatenate) a 
second object mass 2, a third object is obtained whose mass is equal to the first two 
added together. As banal as it may seem to a physicist, this proposition is elusive to the 
psychologist. How do you concatenate two motivations, two types of intelligences, two 
perceptive abilities, two emotional states, etc.?
However, the fundamental measurement is possible even without the property of con-
catenation: this is where conjoint measurement comes in (Luce and Tukey 1964).
The next section explains how obtain “fundamental measurement” in the framework 
of Experimental Phenomenology.
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Methods
Formalisations
The theory of conjoint measurement says that a performance (P) is due to the conjoint 
effect of two parameters: a characteristic of a subject (B) and a characteristic of a stimu-
lus (D). These parameters can be placed in a two-dimensional structure, as in Fig. 1.
It follows that every performance is a multiplicative transformation of B and D, that is
Using a logarithmic conversion the above formula can be converted into a type of lin-
ear transformation
It is possible to proceed with the replacements
Another simplification can be made
βn is also called subject value scale and corresponds to the position of the subject along 
the measured variable continuum; δi is also called stimulus value scale and corresponds 
to the position of the stimulus along the same continuum of the measured variable. For 
example, in the case where the phenomenological-experimental task consists of deter-
mining the discriminative ability of a group of subjects, βn represents the discriminative 
ability of the nth subject and δi the difficulty of the ith stimulus to be discriminated. 
Ability and difficulty can be represented along the same continuum in which the rela-
tionship of subject parameters and stimulus parameters are shown. As per Fig.  2 for 
example, the subject with ability β4 is able to discriminate difficult stimuli δ3 and δ6, but 
not δ2, δ1, δ3 and δ4.
The position of βn and δi in Fig. 2 is related to the experimental data on the basis of the 
following logic:
Pni =
Bn
Di
ln(Pni) = ln(Bn)− ln(Di)
ln(Pni) = ni; ln(Bn) = βn; ln(Di) = δi
ni = βn − δi
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Fig. 1 Two-dimensional graph of a stimulus/subject relationship
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1. if βn falls to the right of δi, it follows that the nth subject dominates the ith stimulus, 
or rather, βn > δi: the subject discriminates the stimulus;
2. if βn falls to the left of δi, it follows that the ith stimulus dominates the nth subject, or 
rather, βn < δi: the subject does not discriminate the stimulus;
It is relatively easy to pass from a linear transformation (the last equation shown) such 
as that of expression to the definition of a mathematical model that specifies the prob-
ability of obtaining a certain discriminative performance in relation to the scalar values 
βn and δi. To this end, the example of detection can be taken, or rather, the simplest 
discriminative performance: formally, the p probability of obtaining a detection (1 = yes 
detection; 0 = no detection) can be indicated as
Seeing as the numerical value of λni falls within the range −∞ and +∞ and that of 
a probability value falls within 0 and 1, we can proceed towards the construction of a 
mathematical model, first reducing the range of variation between 0 and +∞ expressing 
λni as an exponent of neperian e
and then reducing the variation in terms of probability dividing by a normalization 
factor
Now we can express the probability of a yes-detection as follows
and probability of a no-detection
The last two equations can represented together
p{ni = 1or 0|βn, δi}
0 < eni < +∞
0 <
eni
1+ eni
< 1
p{ni = 1|βn, δi} =
eni
1+ eni
p{ni = 0|βn, δi} =
1
1+ eni
β2 β1 β4 β3 β6 β5
δ3 δ6 δ2 δ1 δ5 δ4
Less 
difficulty
Less
ability
Greater
difficulty
Greater
ability
Fig. 2 Hypothetical relationship between discriminative ability of subjects and difficulty of the stimuli to be 
discriminated
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Breaking down λni into its scalar values, we obtain
This expression is the formalization of a Simple Logistic Model, known as Rasch 
Model (Rasch 1960; Andrich 1988), as is shown in Fig. 3.
Similar considerations can be made for the entire family of Rasch models, with both 
dichotomous and categorical data (Wright and Masters 1982).
Mathematical demonstrations
It is possible to demonstrate that Rasch’s model has the three above-mentioned proper-
ties of fundamental measurement.
Linearity
Starting from the categorical response scale, raw scores gathered do not form interval 
measurement scales because of the non-linear metric typical of cumulative sequences 
in which a subject can obtain scores that oscillate from a minimum to a maximum, pro-
ceeding, step by step, by constant increments (Wright and Masters 1982). In cases as 
the one just described, the extreme categories of the ordinal scale of responses are flat-
tened out. Raw scores show the phenomenon in question exactly the way a distorting 
mirror reflects an object; all the elements of the object appear to be laid out in a correct 
sequential way (think, for example, of a body: the head is above the chest and the chest 
is above the legs), but the proportions have been modified by a good deal (lengthened 
head, squeezed chest, distorted legs, etc.). By using a Rasch model it is possible to avoid 
this problem, by defining a particular unit of measurement, called logit, which has the 
same value all along the continuum of the latent variable. A logit is a mathematical unit 
which comes from the logarithmic form of the model and it arises from the relationship 
of probabilities that are mutually exclusive. The following shows a case of detection in 
p{ni = wni|βn, δi, wni = (0, 1)} =
ewni ni
1+ ewni ni
p{ni = wni|βn, δi, wni = (0, 1)} =
ewni(βn−δi)
1+ e(βn−δi)
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Fig. 3 Simple logistic model: probability of a right/wrong response
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which the probability of obtaining a yes detection (response 1, numerator) and the prob-
ability of not obtaining one (response 0, denominator) are related.
Since it is the difference βn − δi that governs the response probability, it is possible to 
add or subtract a constant of some type for different levels of ability of the subjects and 
of difficulty, in a general sense, of the stimuli without changing the relationship βn − δi. 
Therefore, the model is additive, something that is characteristic of a constant interval 
scale.
Specific objectivity
Starting from the performance, the relationship between stimulus parameters is not 
influenced by subject parameters. With two stimuli i and j and two subjects n and m, we 
can write
that is, the relationship between the parameters of the two stimuli i and j are absolutely 
not influenced by the parameters n and m of the subjects (indeed, β disappears from the 
formula). The same can be said for the relationship between the subjects, which is not 
influenced by the stimuli (indeed, δ disappears from the formula)
Stochastic independence
The probability associated with a pattern of responses given to i stimuli by a subject n is 
the same product of the response probabilities given to each of the i stimuli. Or rather
This property is also called “local independence”. If the responses λni and λnj of the 
same person to the two distinct stimuli i and j are considered, we can write
and presuming that the response pattern given is equal to (1,0), or (0,1), it follows that
Considering that now the total scores of both patterns (1,0) and (0,1) are always equal 
to tn = 1, the probability to be obtained tn (that is, total score of subject n) can be written
logit = ln

 e(βn−δi)1+e(βn−δi)
1
1+e(βn−δi)

 = ln�e(βn−δi)� = βn − δi
(βn − δi)−
(
βn − δj
)
= (βm − δi)−
(
βm − δj
)
⇒ δj − δi = δj − δi
(βn − δi)− (βm − δi) =
(
βn − δj
)
−
(
βm − δj
)
⇒ βn − βm = βn − βm
p(n1, n2, n3, . . . , ni) = p(n1) · p(n2) · p(n3) · · · · · p(ni)
p
(
ni, nj
)
= p(ni) · p
(
nj
)
p
(
ni = 1, nj = 0
)
⇒
[
e(βn−δi)
1+ e(βn−δi)
][
1
1+ e(βn−δj)
]
p
(
ni = 0, nj = 1
)
⇒
[
1
1+ e(βn−δi)
][
e(βn−δj)
1+ e(βn−δj)
]
p(tn = 1) = p
(
ni = 1, nj = 0
)
+
(
ni = 0, nj = 1
)
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It is now possible to define the conditional probability of a correct response to one of 
the two stimuli under consideration, posited as a condition of the total score tn = 1. For 
λni = 1
Similarly for λnj = 1
Stochastic independence and conditional probability permit us to state that the prob-
ability of obtaining a precise response pattern for a generic subject n and stimuli i, 
given a value (in terms of total score) tn, is not related to parameter β of the subject, 
but it depends solely on parameter δ of the stimuli (this can be affirmed by the fact that 
parameter β disappears completely in the two previous formulas). Thus, we can speak 
of a sample-free condition. Similarly, it can demonstrated that the relative pattern of a 
generic stimulus i to which two subjects respond is not linked to the parameter δ of the 
stimulus, but solely to parameter β of the subjects (test-free condition). For λni = 1, the 
probability of obtaining si (that is, the total score of stimulus i) is
Similarly for λmi = 1
Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that a response pattern does not have more 
information than that of the synthetic parameters tn and si. For this reason tn and si are 
defined as “sufficient statistics”. All estimation procedures for the parameters βn e δi have 
sufficient statistics for subjects and stimuli as a starting point (Baker 1987; Gustafsson 
1980; Wright 1980; Andersen 1982; Rost 1982; Van den Wollenberg 1982; Molenaar 
1983; Niemöller and Van Schuur 1983). Given these properties and the independence of 
the estimation of βn with respect to δi, it can be said that with regards to δi, it is not nec-
essary to hypothesize that the distribution of subjects is normal or otherwise: any type 
of distribution is acceptable (Andrich 1989). The same can be said for βn: it is not nec-
essary to hypothesize any type distribution of the stimuli. With the model established, 
that is, the existing relationship between probabilities of emission of a certain response 
and scalar values βn and δi, it is important to adopt algorithmic procedures (Wright 
and Masters 1982) that start with experimentally gathered data (a simple two way table 
“stimulus X participants”) which lead to an estimation of the parameters βn e δi on logit 
scales. Some of the most well-known estimation procedures are: JMLE (Joint Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation, Wright and Panchapakesan 1969), XMLE (eXclusory Maximum 
p
(
ni = 1, nj = 0
)
p(tn = 1)
=
[
e(βn−δi)
1+e(βn−δi)
][
1
1+e
(
βn−δj
)
]
[
e(βn−δi)
1+e(βn−δi)
][
1
1+e
(
βn−δj
)
]
+
[
1
1+e(βn−δi)
][
e
(
βn−δj
)
1+e
(
βn−δj
)
] = e−δi
e−δi + e−δj
p
(
ni = 0, nj = 1
)
p(tn = 1)
=
e−δj
e−δj + e−δi
p(ni = 1, mi = 0)
p(si = 1)
=
[
e(βn−δi)
1+e(βn−δi)
][
1
1+e(βm−δi)
]
[
e(βn−δi)
1+e(βn−δi)
][
1
1+e(βm−δi)
]
+
[
1
1+e(βn−δi)
][
e(βm−δi)
1+e(βm−δi)
] = e−βn
e−βn + e−βm
p(ni = 0, mi = 1)
p(si = 1)
=
e−βm
e−βm + e−βn
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Likelihood Estimation, Linacre 1989), PROX (normal apPROXimation algorithm, Cohen 
1979), MMLE (Marginal Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Bock and Aitkin 1981), 
CMLE (Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Follmann 1988), PMLE (Pairwise 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Rasch 1960; Choppin 1968, 1976, 1978, 1981), WMLE 
(Weighted Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Warm 1989).
Discussion
A Psychophysics application
The possibility of obtaining effective measurements on the ability of subjects (βn) and 
the difficulty of stimuli (δi), are usually the point of arrival of psychophysical procedures 
by which experimental data are gathered. Psychophysics (Fechner 1860; Gescheider 
1997; Guilford 1954; Kingdom and Prins 2016) has always been dedicated to revealing 
the intensity of mental processes linked to perception of physical phenomena capable of 
eliciting a sensation according to a model in which the intensity of the physical event is 
generally recorded directly through the use of measuring instruments capable of making 
quantifications that are considered objective (Campbell 1920) and the entity of percep-
tive phenomena is generally inferred according to Experimental Phenomenology proce-
dures, starting from responses given from a sample of experimental subjects.
In these terms, a psychophysicist studies the laws of connections with physical meas-
urements and judgements of a phenomenological character generated by the percep-
tion of the physical environment. It follows that psychophysical methods must therefore 
bring about identification of functional relationships between an objective continuum of 
physical stimuli Φ and a latent continuum of phenomenal judgements Ψ.
Situations exist, however, in which the classical psychophysical model cannot be used, 
in as much as the physical continuum Φ is not really available. Take, for example, the 
contrary dimensions of hot and cold: these dimensions exist only on a phenomenal level, 
that is, there is no unit of specific physical measurement to distinguish the two and to 
allow for quantification. In fact, a physicist would speak of a stimulus Φ1 that, for exam-
ple, has a temperature of 500 K, or of a stimulus Φ2 with a temperature of 2000 K, but 
Kelvin degrees are units of measurements and they do not describe the sensation of hot 
or cold. Normally, a unit of physical measurement implies a sense of a specific dimen-
sion to the point that speaking of that unit puts ideas of what is being spoken about in 
that dimension into order and not that of others: if we say simply degrees Kelvin, we 
immediately understand that we are speaking of a temperature, but we do not under-
stand precisely if it is hot or cold. This goes without saying in that, by definition, units of 
measurement are those parts of a continuum for which value 1 has been conventionally 
attributed. Therefore, if a unit of measurement is a portion of value 1 on continuum A, it 
cannot a portion of value 1 on continuum B at the same time, except where A and B are 
the same continuum. It follows that on the one hand temperature and hot–cold on the 
other cannot have the same unit of measurement in that the term temperature refers to 
a physical continuum, while the terms hot–cold refer to phenomenal continuums, and 
physical and phenomenal are certainly not the same thing. Thus, it goes without saying 
that degrees Kelvin is a measurement of temperature only, in as much as it is a portion of 
value 1 that is only on the physical continuum of temperature. If we were to try to carry 
out a classical psychophysical analysis of hot/cold by starting with degrees Kelvin, this 
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would lead to an undesirable psychophysical function in reality that relates units of tem-
perature measurements to phenomenal units.
Practically all psychophysical research conducted nowadays is based on the concept of 
Stevens’ defined measurement (1946), according to which “measuring is assigning num-
bers to objects based on rules.” According to Michell (1999), this associated definition 
together with ignoring that a construct, in order to be measurable, must have an additive 
structure, raises the doubt that both Experimental Psychology in general and Psycho-
physics in particular, ignore, to a great degree, the structures of the variables that they 
study. Dichotomous and ordinal data are often treated as interval scales and no verifying 
of the additive structure of the variables is carried out.
Scientific measurements require that measurements assigned to attributes/constructs 
are independent of the experimental subjects: this is not what happens in traditional 
Psychophysics where measurements are confused with people’s responses. Quantifying 
a stimulus from this viewpoint means admitting that the stimulus changes in relation-
ship to the people to whom it is proposed. This is a big limit: to make a comparison with 
Physics, it is as if we said that 1000 K of the temperature of an object depends on who 
is measuring the temperature and not on the object itself. Traditional psychophysical 
research confuses calibration of stimuli with the measurement of the constructs (Wright 
and Stone 1979). Moreover, there are many researchers in the field of Human Sciences 
who entirely reject the idea of trying to measure psychological constructs because they 
are considered to be too complex to be subject to an “insulting process of reduction-
ism to mere numbers” (Bond and Fox 2015). This bias seems to be generated both from 
the overrated opinion that the psychological-scientific community has of measure-
ments made in physics and the underrated opinion it has of psychometric quantification 
procedures.
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that various alarm bells have been ringing through-
out the history of experimental psychology (Loevinger 1947; Gulliksen 1950; Tucker 
1953; Angoff 1960) the traditional mindset (Stevens) remains predominant, causing 
what Michell (1997) defines “confused methodological thinking”.
A solution
A possible solution can be to describe the laws of connections between the physical and 
the phenomenal, starting with the scalar values Ψ of subjects (βn) and the scalar values Φ 
of stimuli (δi) as above described.
With respect to the classical approach, this procedure allows for a quantification that 
measures characteristics of both stimuli and subjects (scalar values δi and βn), and it 
allows for the construction of a psychophysical function even if the physical continuum 
is not actually available (as in the case mentioned of the hot–cold contraries), in that the 
common psychophysical function Ψ =  f(Φ) becomes the function Ψi =  f(δi), when for 
each scalar values δi exists a direct evaluation of the psychological sensation Ψi. In addi-
tion, this procedure allows for the relationship Ψn = g(βn) between responses of subjects 
and their abilities to be studied, when for each scalar values βn exists a direct subject’s 
evaluation Ψn.
The classical psychophysical function Ψ = f(Φ) cannot be studied without stimuli Φ, 
but the functions Ψi =  f(δi) and Ψn = g(βn) can be used without any problems: stimuli 
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Φ are only those things that produce the sensation, but we are not interested in their 
physical properties. Come to think of it, this is exactly what happens in the cases of phe-
nomenological explanations: take, for example, the phenomenon of phenomenal trans-
parency from Fuchs (1923) and Metelli (1974) in which they manipulate the stimuli, but 
the perceptive fact, namely transparency, is explained only by way of reference to other 
perceptive facts. Scalar values of stimuli, δi, only come from responses given by subjects 
to the stimuli, from a quantification, which we could say is phenomenal, of the sensa-
tions, but they are certainly not the stimuli.
A simulated study
In this context it seemed appropriate to refer to an simulated study of two-dimensional 
constructs that are typically phenomenal, the opposite qualities of hot and cold, in order 
to continue the above discussion.
Stimuli 20 objects Φ of the same shape and size which are different only for their sur-
face temperature. Between a stimulus and the precedent and successive it is believed 
that constant temperature variation higher than the differential threshold is obtained.
Participants 100 subjects, evenly distributed by sex and age.
Procedure subjects touch (for a fixed time of t seconds) the surface of the objects with 
the palm of their hands, one at a time and at time intervals that have been studied so 
that there is no reciprocal influence. There are two experimental phases: in the first 
one, the subjects are asked to evaluate on a scale of 7 points (from 0 =  “not at all” to 
6 = “extremely”) how hot the object appears. At the end of the first phase, the second 
one begins where the participants are asked to evaluate on the same 7-point scale how 
cold an object appears. At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects touch the whole 
range of stimuli to get them used to the responses of the set of stimuli.
Results at the end of the experiment, two distinct data matrices (see structure of 
Table 1) are produced, with stimuli and subjects, one for each experimental phase (thus, 
one for hot and one for cold). The next step would be to carry out analysis of the data 
with the Extended Logistic Models, from the Rasch family of models (Andrich 1978a, b, 
c, 1988) which leads to an estimation of the scalar values βn and δi starting from the cat-
egorical data. There are many statistical softwares able to estimate the scalar values βn 
and δi starting from matrices as Table 1. A great open-source solution is eRm package 
(Mair and Hatzinger 2007) of the R-software environment for statistical computing and 
graphics (R Core Team 2016).
Table 1 Theoretical dataset: stimuli × subjects
Stimuli Φi Average (subject) values
Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 … Φ20
Subjects Sn
 S1 Ψ1-1 Ψ1-2 Ψ1-3 … Ψ1-20 ΨS1
 S2 Ψ2-1 Ψ2-2 Ψ2-3 … Ψ2-20 ΨS2
 S3 Ψ3-1 Ψ3-2 Ψ3-3 … Ψ3-20 ΨS3
 … … … … … … …
 S100 Ψ100-1 Ψ100-2 Ψ100-3 … Ψ100-20 ΨS100
Average (stimulus) values ΨΦ1 ΨΦ2 ΨΦ3 … ΨΦ20
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Already other papers show how it is possible to use the Rasch models in Psychophys-
ics. (Vidotto et al. 1996; Burro et al. 2011; Bianchi et al. 2011).
The scalar values βn and δi can be laid out along the same continuum (in units of log-
its), one for the hot variable and one for the cold variable, on which it is possible to com-
pare stimuli and subjects according to the logic proposed in Fig. 2.
In reference to the Table 1, the functions Ψi = f(δi) and Ψn = g(βn) became respectively 
ΨΦi = f(δi) and ΨSn = g(βn). They can be represented as in Fig. 4.
Conclusions
According to Wright and Stone (1999), no scientific method is complete if it is not based 
on a concept of fundamental measurement.
What follows are some clarifications on the above explained procedure and on its 
position in the scientific research. It doesn’t mean that in order to make discoveries or 
to give scientific explanations it is necessary to have an authorized method that respects 
the principles of fundamental measurement. The cited properties of linearity, stochastic 
independence and specific objectivity have always been associated with the concept of 
measurement, and not that of discovery and explanation. Certainly, a good mathematical 
model can produce qualitatively better and more precise measurements. Therefore, the 
idea is that a more refined instrument can, in certain situations, provide a better descrip-
tion and explanation of an already known phenomenon, while in other situations it may 
lead to a discovery. The example of the telescope seems fitting: in some cases, a telescope 
with a better power of resolution allows one to see an already known planet better, but in 
other cases it may lead to the identification of new ones, that is, discoveries.
In the same way, the proposal procedure as was seen above sometimes describes the 
correct relationship between the world, subject and experience, and in other cases it 
means using an approach for the study of new facts.
There are few psychologists and sociologists who are aware of this. This is true not so 
much because they disapprove of fundamental measurement, but only because for the 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Ψ
Φ
i - C
O
LD
(arbitrary
units)
HOT
COLD
Ψ
Φ
i  -
 H
O
T
(a
rb
itr
ar
y
un
its
)
0.5
0.0 -0.50.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ψ
Sn
-H
O
T
(a
rb
itr
ar
y
un
its
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Ψ
S
n  - C
O
LD
(arbitrary
units)
HOT
COLD
δi (logit) βn (logit)
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most part they do not know how to obtain it. In the pages of this paper the attempt has 
tried to make up for this lack at least partially, by showing that it is possible to carry out 
a fundamental measurement starting from Experimental Phenomenology by way of the 
Theory of Conjoint Measurement (Luce and Tukey 1964).
The Theory of Conjoint Measurement recognizes that the idea of measuring, as it is 
meant in Physics, is too simple to be used in psychosocial research. Physics has to do 
with objects that allow for operations of concatenation: it is easy to show that the weight 
of two bags together is the same as the sum of the single sacks weighed individually.
Proposing, as it has been done here, the Rasch model as a point of contact between 
Experimental Phenomenology, and the Theory of Conjoint Measurement does not mean 
that it is not possible to use other mathematical transformations which allow for the car-
rying out of the same considerations. In fact, the Theory of Conjoint Measurement does 
not specify what the monotone function has to be that links the probability that a sub-
ject gives one particular response on the one hand, and the ability of the subject and 
difficulty of the stimulus on the other hand. Speaking of this, in the psychometric litera-
ture (Lord and Novick 1968), two well-known functions are usually considered: normal 
inverse and logistic inverse. Both of these have properties of fundamental measurement, 
but the latter (which is none other than a Rasch model) offers better statistical properties 
for the estimation of ability (βn) and difficulty (δi) parameters, starting from the raw data 
received in an experimental task.
Concerning types of cumulative stochastic models, the Rasch family of models focuses 
on the evaluation of two expectations (Rasch 1960; Wright and Stone 1979). Taking the 
case of detection, for example a subject having better discriminative ability must be 
associated with a greater response emission probability of a yes detection to any of the 
stimuli under examination with respect to a less capable subject, and it is more probable 
that a subject has a detection with an easy stimulus than with a difficult one.
Given that, by definition, a measurement according to Rasch’s analysis is not deter-
ministic, deviations from expectations specified above in the data during the experiment 
can be recorded. And, it is possible that certain subjects respond that they perceived 
difficult stimuli and did not perceive the easy ones. In other words, it may happen that 
subjects may display behaviour that is non-cumulative/non-unidimensional.
Quantification and successive evaluation of discrepancies that exist among response 
matrices and expectations emerging from a Rasch analysis are indicators to the experi-
menter of the quality of the measurements obtained (Duncan 1984).
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